“Neuroscience & Philosophy”

December 7, 2010

By Bennett, Hacker, Searle, Dennett and Robinson.
A debate within the walls of a single book.
Subtitled, “Brain, Mind & Language”

First, Bennett & Hacker

p5 “Distinguishing conceptual questions from empirical ones is of the first importance.”

p4 “Conceptual questions antecede questions of truth and falsehood. They are questions concerning our forms of representation, not questions concerning the truth or falsehood of empirical statements.”

p5 “Cognitive neuroscience operates across the boundary between two fields, neurophysiology and psychology, the respective concepts of which are categorially dissimilar.”

p9 “Science is no more immune to conceptual error and confusion than any other form of intellectual endeavour.”

p6 “One such [conceptual entanglement] is evident in the persistent ascription of psychological attributes to the brain.”

p7 “The brain and its activities make it possible for us – not for [the brain] – to perceive and think, to feel emotions, and to form and pursue projects.”

p11 “[O]ur concern in this book is not with the use of new technical concepts. We are concerned with the misuse of old non-technical concepts – concepts of mind and body, of thought and imagination, of sensation and perception, of knowledge and memory, of voluntary movement and consciousness and self-consciousness.”


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